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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, / 
Plaintiff/Respondent, / 
vs. / 
Court of Appeals No. 
MARK G. MILLER, / 930090-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. / 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction to hear the above entitled appeal is 
conferred upon the Utah Court of Appeals, pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated 77-1-6(1)(g)(b). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD 
OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the lower court commit error by not granting the 
defendant's motion to dismiss or suppress the criminal information 
against the defendant. 
The Standard of Review, The Utah Court of Appeals in 
considering a motion to suppress, reviews a trial court's 
underlying factual findings under a "clearly erroneous standard" 
State v. Sierra, 754 P2d 972 (Utah, App. 1988) However, the Court 
of Appeals reviews the trial court's ultimate legal conclusions 
flowing from these factual findings under a "correctness standard". 
State v. Steward, 806 P2d 213, (Utah, App. 1991) State v. Lopez, 
831 P2d 1040 (Utah App. 1992) 
2. Did the lower court commit error by not granting the 
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defendants motion to suppress the specimen result either as an 
unreasonable search and seizure or allowing such result to be 
admitting foundationally without a proper chain of evidence. 
The Standard of Review. The Court of Appeal in 
considering a motion to suppress, reviews a trial court's 
underlying factual findings under a "clearly erroneous standard" 
State v. Sierra, 754 P2d 972 (Utah, App. 1988) However, the Court 
of Appeals reviews the trial court's ultimate legal conclusions 
flowing from these factual findings under a "correctness standard". 
State v. Steward, 806 P2d 213, (Utah, App. 1991) State v. Lopez, 
831 P2d 1040 (Utah App. 1992) 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTION, AND PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES AND RULES 
There are no constitutional or provisions, statutes or 
rules, which are determinative in and of themselves of the issues 
presented in this case. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from "conditional" pleas of guilty 
entered in the First Judicial District Court, in and for Cache 
County, State of Utah, on the 17th day of December, 1992, the 
Honorable Gordon J. Low, District Court Judge presiding, entered 
pursuant to a stipulation with the State of Utah permitting an 
appeal on the motions previously filed by the defendant and ruled 
upon by the lower court in favor of the State of Utah. 
The defendant was sentenced on February 8, 1993, to serve 
a term in the Utah State Prison not to exceed five (5) years, and 
the lower court having issued an order granting the defendant a 
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Certificate of Probable Cause pending disposition while the legal 
aspects of this case are on appeal with the Utah Court of Appeals. 
The defendant, Mark G. Miller, was charged in a four count 
information of having committed the offenses of Unlawful Possession 
of a Controlled Substance, a Third Degree Felony, Unlawful 
Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a Class B Misdemeanor, DUI, a 
Class B Misdemeanor, and Failure to Use Headlights, a Class B 
Misdemeanor. (R - ) 
A preliminary hearing was conducted on August 27, 1991, in the 
Circuit Court, Cache County and said preliminary hearing was 
transcribed and constitutes the Statement of Facts for 
determination of legal issues. (Suppression TR - 13,14) 
Defendant will for purposes of setting forth his Statement of 
Facts, identify the preliminary hearing transcript as "TR". 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On February 1, 1991, Officer Dennis Simonson, a Police Officer 
for Logan City was on duty at approximately 11:30 p.m. and 
proceeded to the intersection of Church and Federal Avenues in 
Logan, Utah. (TR 6-7) 
Officer Simonson testified at the preliminary hearing as he 
got to the intersection of Church and Federal he made a turn going 
north and at the time of doing so, observed a red Jeep Cherokee 
parked at the east curb facing northbound. He proceeded past that 
vehicle and pulled into a parking lot approximately 60 - 80 feet 
away with his purpose to see if anyone in the vehicle was going to 
be drinking out of an open container since he was working a special 
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alcohol assignment that night. (TR 7) 
After being stationary for approximately one (1) minute 
waiting to see if there would be any alcohol violation in the 
vehicle, the vehicle's motor started up and a few seconds later it 
pulled northbound a length or two and negotiated a u-turn and did 
so without headlights or taillights on the vehicle. As the 
vehicle made the u-turn, it proceeded south on Church Street and as 
it got to the stop sign at Federal Avenue, it made a complete stop 
and the headlights came on in the vehicle. (TR 8-9) 
Officer Simonson further testified that the vehicle was in the 
travel lane not in the parking lane at that time, and after a 
second or two, the vehicle progressed across the intersection 
approximately seventy-five (75) feet and pulled to the curb and 
parked. He then observed the driver get out of the driver's side 
and walk around the vehicle when another person exited the 
passenger side and replaced the first person as the driver. (TR 
9) 
Officer Simonson then left the parking lot and proceeded to 
follow the vehicle as it was proceeding up towards First East, with 
said vehicle being the only vehicle on the road at that particular 
time and eventually followed the vehicle to an area down by the 
roller rink at which the time his red lights were activated and the 
vehicle was pulled over and stopped. (TR 9) 
As Officer Simonson approached the driver of the vehicle, Mr. 
Franklin, he told him that he wanted to speak to his passenger, and 
thereupon walked around the vehicle to the passenger area of the 
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Jeep, where he observed the defendant seated. (TR 11) 
There was a second Mr. Miller (Chris Miller) in the rear of 
the vehicle but Officer Simonson addressed his attention to the 
defendant herein and stated as follows: 
"I told him the reason I was talking to him was I 
observed his vehicle pull over to the side and I asked 
him why he got out of the vehicle and changed drivers. 
His statement to me at that time, if I may quote, was, NI 
have had too much to drink so I didn't want to drive'"• 
(TR 11-12) 
Upon cross examination, Officer Simonson testified there is a 
street light in that particular area on that intersection, but that 
he did not know which corner it faced. (TR 28) Further, he could 
not identify the driver seated in the vehicle because of the 
position of the driver who was in the shaded area inside the 
vehicle. (TR 28) 
Officer Simonson testified to the time period involved in the 
making of the u-turn as follows? 
"If you take the time from the motor starting and 
then leaving the curb, you would have more than ten (10) 
seconds. As far as the actual driving, it would probably 
be approximately that time, yes." (TR 30) 
Officer Simonson indicated the headlights were turned on at 
the intersection and the vehicle proceeded a safe distance of 
approximately seventy-five (75) feet the other side of the 
intersection before seeing the driver get out and walk to the other 
side. (TR 31) 
After seeing the exchange of drivers, he offered the following 
in response to questions by counsel as to why he proceeded to 
follow the vehicle: 
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Q: Okay, now as it proceeded up there are you still 
parked at your vantage point where you had made your 
other observations? 
A: As it pulled from the curb, I turned to make a 
comment to my ride-along that something was unusual, due 
to the fact that you don't normally change drivers, but 
with the nearness of it being from a drinking 
establishment, that may be one of the reasons that they 
changed drivers. At that time, I left the parking lot 
and proceeded after the vehicle. 
Q: So I guess what your telling me is it went 
through your mind that we're near a drinking 
establishment so maybe alcohol is involved? 
A: That's correct. 
Q: You had no observations to indicate that factor 
to you, though, did you? 
A: That's correct. (TR - 34) 
The Officer further testified he followed the vehicle for 
two (2) blocks, perhaps even three (3) blocks after the exchange of 
drivers and nothing was suggestive that the driver was impaired. 
(TR - 35) 
The following testimony was also adduced from Officer 
Simonson: 
Qs As he proceeded through the intersection, 
right? 
A: The lights were on as he proceeded. He stopped. 
There was a stop of at least a full second, then the 
lights were on and the then vehicle proceeded across the 
intersection. 
Q: So the vehicle made a proper stop? 
A: Yes, it did. 
Q: And there was nothing unusual about the way it 
proceeded through the intersection or pulled to the curb 
on the other side of the highway, other side of the 
intersection, is that correct? 
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A: That's correct. 
Q: Now, as the vehicle made that particular u-
turn, where you first observed it into motion, without 
the lights, as you testified to, was there anything 
unusual, other than the lights not being on, or 
indicative of person being under the influence of any 
kind of drugs or alcohol? 
A: No. 
Officer Simonson testified that after the exchange of drivers 
there was nothing to suggest that the second driver was under the 
influence of alcohol nor did such (second) individual commit any 
moving violation of any nature. (TR 36) 
The Officer further testified he had not seen where the 
original driver had seated himself after exiting the vehicle. (TR 
37) 
Officer Simonson testified that he had not seen them 
(individuals in vehicle) at the local drinking establishment in the 
area of Church and Federal and therefore did not ask the defendant 
if he had been at any such establishment. (TR 40-41) He also 
indicated he did not see where the original driver seated himself 
after exiting the vehicle. (TR 37) 
After the vehicle was stopped, the defendant was requested to 
step from the vehicle and perform certain field sobriety tests and 
after performing those tests, Officer Simonson arrested the 
defendant for driving under the influence. (TR 41-42) 
The defendant in addition to a breath test which was 
performed, was requested to take a blood or urine test, which the 
defendant politely declined to do and at no time ever agreed to 
give a urine sample. (TR 48) 
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Officer L.E. Earl of the Logan City Police Department 
testified that during the booking he observed Cache County Sheriff 
Deputy Maples remove a small bindle of something containing a 
powdery substance from defendant's pocket. (TR 56) 
Cache County Deputy, Dale Maples also testified the defendant 
was in a holding cell and after the defendant used a urinal, 
Officer Simonson requested he be removed to another holding cell so 
a urine sample could be obtained. (TR 60) Officer Maples also 
testified from where he was sitting, he could not see the defendant 
urinating but could see him standing at the urinal. (TR 62) 
The defendant on or about March 17, 1992, based on the 
foregoing facts, motioned the court to dismiss or suppress all 
proceedings against the defendant and motioned the court to 
suppress the specimen result. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The defendant, Mark G. Miller asserts the lower court 
committed error in not granting the defendant's Motion to Dismiss 
or Suppress criminal informations against him for such actions of 
the police officer stopping the vehicle was in violation of U.C.A. 
77-7-15 and/or constituted a pretext stop in violation of 
defendant's constitutional rights. 
The defendant asserts the lower court also committed error in 
not granting the defendant's Motion to Suppress the Specimen 
Results both for lack of a proper chain of evidence and because 
such seizure was violative of defendant's right to be free from 




DID THE LOWER COURT COMMIT ERROR IN NOT 
DISMISSING THE CRIMINAL INFORMATION AGAINST 
THE DEFENDANT BY VIRTUE OF VIOLATION OF U.C.A. 
77-7-15 
U.C.A. 77-7-15 is the codified statutory provision relating to 
police officers' right to stop any person upon reasonable suspicion 
and specifically provides as follows: 
U.C.A. 77-7-15 " A peace officer may stop any person 
in a public place when he has a reasonable suspicion that 
he has committed or is in the act of committing or is 
attempting to commit a public offense, and may demand his 
name, address and an explanation of his actions". 
In State v. Talbot, 792 P2d 489 (Utah, App. 1990), the Utah 
Court of Appeals in one of a series of cases dealing with a brief 
investigatory stop pursuant to U.C.A. 77-7-15 provided that the 
reasonable suspicion contained in such statute must be based upon 
objective facts, which indicate the existence of criminal activity 
and the peace officer must be able to articulate what it is about 
those facts which leads to an inference of criminal activity. 
State v. Talbot, cited supra, further provides the facts must 
be judged against an objective standard, or in other words, would 
the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure, 
warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief the action 
taken was appropriate and anything less would invite intrusions 
upon constitutionally guaranteed rights based on nothing more 
substantial than inarticulate hunches. 
The Utah Court of Appeals in State v. Talbot, cited supra, 
held the police officers lacked a reasonable suspicion of criminal 
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activities justifying a stop of the vehicle, where the defendant's 
vehicle had crested a hill approximately one-quarter (1/4) of a 
mile from a 1:00 a.m. roadblock, and had stopped abruptly, turning 
around in the middle of the road and headed away from the 
roadblock. 
Avoiding contact with the police officer and avoiding a road 
block, does not create an articulable suspicion that the occupants 
of the vehicles have engaged in or about to engage in criminal 
activity and thus the stop of the vehicle was an unwarranted police 
intrusion and all evidence obtained was suppressed. 
The court refused to allow bootstrapping traffic violations as 
a basis for the stop, when the real thrust for the stop was 
avoidance of the road block similar to defendant's present appeal 
where the real thrust for the stop was why did the defendant cease 
driving and allow another to drive the vehicle. 
In State v. Baird, 763 P2d 1214 (Utah, App. 1988), the Court 
held reasonable suspicion depends on the totality of the 
circumstances and made reference to a number of prior Utah 
decisions relating to what constitutes reasonable suspicion. The 
court held no reasonable articulable suspicion exists to justify 
the stop where the officer articulated as follows: 
"Something just struck me funny about it, referring to 
the license plate sticker." 
Such reference to the license plate sticker and Officer 
Simonson,s testimony smack of similarly wherein Officer Simonson 
testified: 
"As it pulled from the curb, I turned to make a 
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comment to my ride-along that something was unusual due 
to the fact that you don't normally change drivers, but 
with the nearness of it being from a drinking 
establishment, that may be one of the reasons why they 
changed drivers". At that time, I left the parking lot 
and proceeded after the vehicle". (TR - 34) 
As can be seen from the officer's testimony, he left the 
parking lot vantage point he had assumed after observing changing 
drivers as opposed to leaving the parking lot after observing the 
short period of time without headlights, and thus, the "hunch" and 
ultimate stop of the vehicle is in violation of U.C.A. 77-7-15. 
In State v. Carpena, 714 P2d 674 (Utah, 1986), the Utah 
Supreme Court declared the police officer lacked reasonable 
suspicion to stop an automobile with out of state license plates 
moving slowly at 3:00 a.m through a neighborhood where a rash of 
burglaries had recently occurred. 
In Sandy City v. Thorsness, 778 P2d 1011 (Utah, App. 1989) the 
Court of Appeals was confronted with a situation where a police 
officer was stopped assisting a motorist in the outside lane of a 
four-lane street at 1:30 a.m. and the defendant, when driving by 
the scene in the same direction pulled around the officer's 
vehicle and stopped his car to observe the activity of the officer 
and occupant until waved on by the officer. The defendant then 
hesitated momentarily before moving away and pulled away at a slow 
rate of speed when no other traffic was in the area at such hour. 
The peace officer making the stop, shortly thereafter, followed the 
defendant's vehicle for several blocks and did not observe any 
suspicious or exceptional driving behavior or traffic violations, 
but noted the defendant drove slowly in the inside lane, twenty 
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miles per hour in a forty five mile per hour zone, but did not 
commit any traffic violation or impede traffic during such time. 
With such information, the Court of Appeals declared stopping 
the defendant's vehicle could be justified only upon a showing of 
reasonable suspicion the defendant had committed or was committing 
a crime or he was stopped incident to a traffic offense, and that 
the suspicion must be based upon articulated objective facts. 
The Court of Appeals in Sandy City v. Thorsness, cited supra, 
held as follows: 
"Defendant did not engage in reckless, erratic 
driving patterns that indicated a lack of vehicle control 
or violated a traffic ordinance." The court declared 
while there may be a multitude of factors that 
objectively indicate the intoxication of a driver, we do 
not believe the driving behavior in this case reasonably 
supports the suspicion of drunk driving. Further, the 
officer's testimony the defendant's slower driving speed 
and his failure to 'move on immediately', when requested 
on a deserted street at 1:30 a.m. while possible indicia 
of intoxication, are equally indicia of innocent behavior 
and without more, do not provide a reasonable basis to 
suspect defendant of being intoxication." 
Similarly, in State v. Robinson, 797 P2d 431 (Utah, App. 
1990), the Utah Court of Appeals held avoidance of eye contact is 
consistent with innocent as well as criminal behavior, and as such, 
can be afforded no weight in determining a detaining officer's 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Additionally, in State 
v. Robinson/ cited supra, the Court of Appeals declared the weight 
to be given the absence of any visible cold weather gear or 
clothing (in winter) is also slight since it does not objectively 
suggest that criminal activity is afoot and is consistent with 
innocent as well as criminal behavior. 
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The import of Thorsness and Robinson, is behavioral action 
must reasonably suggest criminal activity is afoot as opposed to 
mere innocent behavior for any behavior, depending upon the 
observer's subjective beliefs may infer whatever the observer wants 
such behavior to suggest. 
Officer Simonson in the instant case after his observations 
declared and as referenced hereinabove "with the nearness of it 
being from a drinking establishment, that may be one of the reasons 
that they changed drivers" and such statement by the officer 
himself, illustrates such behavior is as indicative of innocent 
conduct as well as criminal activity. This also must be coupled 
with the fact officer Simonson testified he saw no use of alcohol 
in the vehicle, nor did he make any observations of the occupants 
having been at a drinking establishment. 
Consequently, the foregoing coupled with the "Pretext 
Doctrine", the stop in the instant proceeding was impermissible. 
The Utah Court of Appeals in State v. Lopez, 831 P2d 1040 
(Utah App. 1992) discussed at length and reaffirmed Utah's adoption 
of the Pretext Doctrine. In State v. Lopez, cited supra, the Utah 
Court of Appeals held as follows: 
"There can be little dispute that in our society, 
minor traffic and equipment violations are pervasive. 
See Sierra 754 P2d at 978-79 ("5W. Lafave - Search and 
Seizure, §5.2(e)(Second Edition, 1987); Kehoe 521 So. 2d 
at 1097. Allowing police officers to stop vehicles for 
any minor violation when the officer in fact is pursuing 
a hunch, would allow officers to seize almost any 
individual on the basis of otherwise unconstitutional 
objectives. Such unfettered discretion offends the 
Fourth Amendment. See Terry v. Ohio 392 US. 1 20 88S. 
Ct. 1868, 1879 (1968); United States v. Smith, 799 F2d at 
711. 
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Additionally, the Utah Court of Appeals in State v. Lopez, 
cited supra, in setting forth a reasonable officer standard and 
cited the following: 
"[A] stop [i]s unreasonable not because the officer 
secretly hope[s] to find evidence of a greater offense, 
but because it [i]s clear that an officer would have been 
uninterested in pursuing the lesser offense absent that 
hope" In other words "the proper basis of concern is not 
with why the officer deviated from the usual practice in 
this case, but simply that he did deviate" " Guzman 
864 F2d at 1517 ("United States v. Smith, 799 F2d at 709 
and 1W. Lafeve - Searches and Seizures 1.4(e) at 94. 
The holding in State v. Lopez cited supra substantially 
reaffirms what had previously been held in State v. Sierra, 754 P2d 
972 (Utah App. 1988) 
In State v. Sierra, 754 P2d 972 (Utah, App. 1988), the Court 
of Appeals held as follows: 
"In determining whether a stop for a traffic 
violation and subsequent arrest is a pretext, the 
totality of the circumstances governed. Bignoni-Ponce, 
422 U.S. at 855 N.10 95S. Ct. at 2582 n.10. In making 
this determination, the subjective intent of the officer 
is irrelevant. Whether a Fourth Amendment violation has 
occurred turns on an objective assessment of the 
officer's actions in light of the facts and circumstances 
confronting him at the time and not on the officer's 
actual state of mind at the time the challenged action 
was taken•" 
The Court of Appeals further held in determining whether the 
officer's stop of Sierra for driving in the left lane, was an 
unconstitutional pretext, that it is necessary to focus on a 
hypothetical reasonable officer in view of the totality of the 
circumstances confronting him at the time and would such 
hypothetical reasonable officer have stopped Sierra to issue a 
warning for driving in the left lane. Thus, the proper inquiry 
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does not focus on whether the officer could validly have made the 
stop of Sierra but whether would such hypothetical reasonable 
officer have made the stop in the absence of pretextual motivation. 
The Court of Appeals declared in State v. Sierra, cited supra, 
a traffic violator is not immune from the seizure evidence of a 
more serious crime provided the gravity of the traffic offense is 
such that any citizen would routinely be stopped for it if seen 
committing the offense by a traffic officer on routine patrol. 
In the instant proceeding, Officer Simonson observed the u-
turn being made without lights, lasting approximately ten seconds 
at which time the headlights of the vehicle were turned on, 
observed the driver stop at the stop sign, proceed through the 
intersection, pull over to the curb a safe distance from the 
intersection, and exit the vehicle without any indication of 
intoxication. This leads to the conclusion that Officer Simonson 
stopped the vehicle because of the exchanging of drivers rather 
than the short period of time when the lights were not illuminated 
when we consider his statement referenced earlier relative to 
sometihing being usual about changing drivers. 
In State v. Talbot, cited supra, a roadblock case, the Court 
of Appeals declared and ruled as follows: 
"It is obvious to us from the evidence produced at 
the suppression hearing, that the stop was not based at 
the time, upon any traffic violations, but rather on the 
conclusion, however flawed, that avoidance of the 
roadblock gave rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity. It is inconsequential that the officers could 
have stopped the vehicle for one or more traffic 
violations, where in fact the stop was for other reasons. 
Courts do not allow an officer to stop and investigate a 
xhunch' about criminal activity through the guise of a 
15 
pretextual traffic violation. Sierra 752 at 977. For 
the same reason, we will not allow the state to justify 
this stop on the retroactive basis that the officers 
might have stopped defendant's vehicle for traffic 
violations appellate counsel believes occurred prior to 
the stop•" 
Similarly, the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Arroyo, 796 P2d 
684 (Utah, 1990) adopted the conclusions of the Court of Appeals 
relative to the pretextual stop (State v. Arroyo 770 P2d 153 (Utah 
App. 1989) holding that under the totality of the circumstances, a 
reasonable officer would not have stopped the defendant and cited 
him for following too closely except for the unarticulated 
suspicion of more serious criminal activity. 
Defendant asserts that failure to use headlights for 
approximately ten (10) seconds is pretextual for such minor 
infraction may not constitute a traffic offense under such 
circumstances and such claim is additionally illustrated by the 
officer's testimony. Officer Simonson testified he made no attempt 
to leave his parked position until after the exchange of drivers 
and his thought that something was unusual due to the fact that " 
you do not normally change drivers, but with the nearness of it 
being from a drinking establishment that may be one of the reasons 
that they changed drivers •>v 
The defendant asserts the stopping of the vehicle was a 
"hunch" as opposed to a reasonably articulable suspicion and 
therefore a pretext to stopping the vehicle for a more serious 
violation which is constitutionally impermissible. 
16 
Point II 
DID THE LOWER COURT COMMIT ERROR BY NOT SUPPRESSING 
ADMISSION OF THE SPECIMEN SAMPLE 
The question of whether or not such specimen result should be 
suppressed is predicated upon defendant asserting that he has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy as well as whether or not such 
sample can be attributed to the defendant predicated upon how such 
sample was obtained and whether or not an appropriate chain of 
evidence is established. 
U.C.A. 41-6-44.10 the Utah Implied Consent Law, affords all 
persons the right to refuse any and all chemical tests, subject to 
administrative proceedings and possible revocation of license. The 
defendant refused to submit to a blood or urine test according to 
the testimony of all officers in the instant proceeding and such 
with the sample in the instant proceeding being obtained from a 
urinal in the jail holding cell, while the defendant was in custody 
and not free to leave. (TR - 60-62) 
In State v. Wilson 582 P2d 826 (New Mex. 1978) , the New Mexico 
Court of Appeals excluded a blood sample taken by a technician 
following defendant's refusal to consent to taking of such sample. 
In State v. Biggar 716 P2d 493 (Hawaii, 1986), the Hawaii 
Supreme Court declared that evidence gathered in a search of a 
toilet stall subsequent to the officer's illegal surveillance 
should have been suppressed. It is well settled that an area in 
which an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy is 
protected by the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution as well as 
the State Constitution and cannot be searched without a warrant, 
17 
and that any warrantless search of a constitutionally protected 
area, is presumptively unreasonable unless there is both probable 
cause and a legally recognized exception to the warrant 
requirement. 
In the instant proceeding, there is no evidence to suggest a 
warrant could not be obtained where the defendant had been removed 
from the holding area where the toilet-urinal was located and such 
area could have remained secure while a search warrant was 
requested from an impartial and detached magistrate. 
In State v. Harris, 671 P2d 175 (Utah, 1983), the Utah Supreme 
Court in reaching its ruling in suppressing a warrantless search 
discussed Katz v. United States, 389 US 347 (1967), declaring a 
defendant must have a subjective expectation of privacy that 
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable and when such 
expectation is present, the defendant is guaranteed to be free from 
unreasonable searches and seizure. 
Further, when a search is conducted outside the judicial 
process without approval by a Judge or Magistrate such search is 
per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, subject to only a 
few specifically established and well delineated exceptions 
including consent, exigent circumstances, and plain view. (State v. 
Harris, cited supra). 
The Idaho Court of Appeals in State v. Limberhand, 788 P2d 857 
(Ida. App., 1990) held, the defendant maintained a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in a toilet stall in a public restroom and 
the plain view doctrine had no application because it did not 
18 
validate seizure of evidence in plain view when such observation 
had its genesis in a fourth amendment violation. 
The fact the defendant herein is under arrest and is being 
held in a holding area removed him from a public place and placed 
defendant in a situation where he was under the complete dominion 
and control of the officers or jailers. 
In addition to the constitutional claims, defendant raised the 
issue of the chain of evidence and proper admissibility of urine 
obtained from a urinal in a holding cell at a jail. (2nd 
Suppression - TR 6-7) 
The defendant requested the court determine pursuant to Utah 
Rules of Evidence 104, the admissibility of such urine sample 
because of the potential prejudicial affect to the defendant should 
such evidence be offered and not received. 
The hearing on November 17, 1992 relates to argument by 
counsel (s) as well as colloquy with the Judge relating to the 
admissibility of such urinal sample result and the court held that 
the State was not precluded from presenting such evidence unless 
the defendant submitted analogous cases within ten (10) days to the 
contrary. (2nd Suppression TR 57) 
Defendant asserted in its argument in the lower court that 
admissibility of scientific evidence concerning fluids must be 
received with caution because in this particular instance, in the 
sample of the urine taken from the urinal, there was traces of 
cocaine and marijuana in the sample, and no marijuana was found on 
defendant's person. (2nd Suppression TR - 48) 
19 
Defendant asserts admitting such evidence is both violative of 
his constitutional right to be free from unlawful searches and 
seizures, under Article 1, Section 14, in the Utah Constitution 
under but also of defendants trial right to be free from highly 
prejudicial evidence being received when the source of such 
evidence is insufficiently linked to the defendant. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing Arguments, the defendant, Mark G. 
Miller, requests this court reverse the judgment of the lower court 
on the motions filed therein and dismiss all charges against the 
above named defendant. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this S{P^ day of April, 1993. 
RONALD W. PERKINS 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
20 
PROOF OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Motion to the plaintiff-respondent's attorney, Attorney 
General's Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84114 on this ^^L^ day of April, 1993. 
RONALD W. PERKINS 




CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
ARTICLE 1, SECTION 14 
[Unreasonable searches forbidden - Issuance of warrant.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable 
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause support by 
oath, or affirmation, particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized. 
•B" 
U.C.A. 77-7-15 
U.C.A. 77-7-15 " A peace officer may stop any person 
in a public place when he has a reasonable suspicion that 
he has committed or is in the act of committing or is 
attempting to commit a public offense, and may demand his 
name, address and an explanation of his actions". 
"C* 
RONALD W. PERKINS (2568) of 
FARR# KAUFMAN, SULLIVAN, GORMAN, 
JENSEN, MEDKSER & PERKINS 
Attorney for Defendant 
Bamberger Square Building 
205 - 26th Street, Suite 34 
Ogden, Utah 844 01 
Telephone: (801) 3 94-552 6 
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 





DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
DISMISS OR SUPPRESS 
/ Case No. 911000694FS 
JUDGE: Gordon J. Low 
/ 
COMES NOW the defendant, MARK MILLER, by and through his 
attorney, Ronald W. Perkins, and hereby motions the above entitled 
court to dismiss and/or suppress the Four Count Information 
charging the defendant with Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol 
and/or Drugs, Driving with No Lights, Possession of a Controlled 
Substance and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia. 
Such Motion is made upon the basis and for the reason that 
the testimony adduced at the preliminary hearing establishes such 
evidence should be dismissed and/or suppressed for the reasons set 
forth hereinafter. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On February 1, 1991, Officer Dennis Simonson, a Police 
Officer for Logan City was on duty at approximately 11:30 p.m. and 
proceeded to the intersection of Church and Federal Avenues in 
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Officer Simonson testified at the preliminary hearing as he 
got to the intersection of Church and Federal he made a turn 
going north and at the time of doing so, observed a red Jeep 
Cherokee parked at the east curb facing northbound. He proceeded 
past that vehicle and pulled into a parking lot approximately 60-
80 feet away with his purpose to see if anyone in the vehicle was 
going to be drinking out of an open container since he was working 
a special alcohol assignment that night. (TR 7) 
After being stationary for approximately one (1) minute 
waiting to see if there would be any alcohol violation in the 
vehicle, the vehicle's motor started up and a few seconds later 
it pulled northbound a length or two and negotiated a u-turn and 
did so without headlights or taillights on the vehicle. As the 
vehicle made the u-turn, it proceeded south on Church Street and 
as it got to the stop sign at Federal Avenue, it made a complete 
stop and the lights came on in the vehicle. (TR 8-9) 
Officer Simonson further testified that the vehicle was in 
the travel lane not in the parking lane at that time, and after a 
second or two, the vehicle progressed across the intersection 
approximately seventy-five (75) feet and pulled to the curb and 
parked. He then observed the driver get out of the driver's side 
and walk around the vehicle when another person exited the 
passenger side and replaced the first person as the driver. (TR 
9) 
Officer Simonson then left the parking lot and proceeded to 
follow the vehicle as it . was proceeding up towards First East, 
with said vehicle being the only vehicle on the road at that 
particular time and eventually followed the vehicle to an area 
down by the roller rink at which the time his red lights were 
activated and the vehicle was pulled over and stopped. (TR 9) 
As Officer Simonson approached the driver of the vehicle, 
Mr. Franklin, he told him that he wanted to speak to his 
passenger, and thereupon walked around the vehicle to the 
passenger area of the Jeep, where he observed the defendant 
seated. (TR 11) 
There was a second Mr. Miller (Chris Miller) in the rear of 
the vehicle but Officer Simonson addressed his attention to the 
defendant herein and stated as follows: 
"I told him the reason I was talking to him was 
I observed his vehicle pull over to the side and I 
asked him why he got out of the vehicle and changed 
drivers. His statement to me at that time, if I may 
quote, was, fI have had too much to drink so I 
didn't want to drive1". (TR 11-12) 
Officer Simonson additionally testified prior to that 
statement having been made by the defendant, he could not identify 
the defendant as the driver of the vehicle. 
Upon cross examination, Officer Simonson testified there is 
a street light in that particular area on that intersection, but 
that he did not know which corner it faced on. (TR 28) Further, 
he could not identify the driver seated in the vehicle because of 
the position the driver was in, in the shaded area inside the 
vehicle. (TR 28) 
Officer Simonson testified to the time period involving in 
the making of the u-turn as follows: 
3 
"If you take the time from the motor starting 
and then leaving the curb, you would have more than 
ten (10) seconds. As far as the actual driving, it 
would probably be approximately that time, yes.11 
(TR 30) 
Officer Simonson indicated that the lights were turned on 
at the intersection and the vehicle proceeded a safe distance of 
approximately seventy-five (75) feet the other side of the 
intersection before seeing the driver get out and walk to the 
other side. (TR 31) 
After seeing the exchange of drivers, offered the following 
in response to questions by counsel as to why he proceeded to 
follow the vehicle: 
Q: Okay, now as it proceeded up there are you 
still parked at your vantage point where you had 
made your other observations? 
A: As it pulled from the curb, I turned to 
make a comment to my ride-along that something was 
unusual, due to the fact that you don't normally 
change drivers, but with the nearness of it being 
from a drinking establishment, that may be one of 
the reasons that they changed drivers. At that 
time, I left the parking lot and proceeded after the 
vehicle. 
Q: So I guess what your telling me is it went 
through your mind that we're near a drinking 
establishment so maybe alcohol is involved? 
A: That's correct. 
Q: You had no observations to indicate that 
factor to you, though, did you? 
A: That's correct. 
.The __ following testimony was also- adduced from Officer 
Simonson: 
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A: The lights were on as he proceeded. He 
stopped. There was a stop of at least a full 
second, then the lights were on and the then vehicle 
proceeded across the intersection. 
Q: So the vehicle made a proper stop? 
A: Yes, it did. 
Q: And there was nothing unusual about the 
way it proceeded through the intersection or pulled 
to the curb on the other side of the highway, other 
side of the intersection, is that correct? 
A: That's correct. 
Q: Now, as the vehicle made that particular 
u-turn, where you first observed it into motion, 
without the lights, as you testified to, was there 
anything unusual, other than the lights not being 
on, or indicative of person being under the 
influence of any kind of drugs or alcohol? 
A: No. 
Officer Simonson testified that after the exchange of 
drivers there was nothing to suggest that the second driver was 
under the influence of alcohol nor did such (second) individual 
commit any moving violation of any nature. (TR 36) 
The Officer further testified he had not seen where the 
original driver had seated himself after exiting the vehicle. (TR 
37) 
Officer Simonson testified that he had not seen them 
(individuals in vehicle) at the local drinking establishment in 
the area of Church and Federal and therefore did not ask the 
defendant if h_e_had been at any such establishment. (TR 40-41) 
He also indicated he did not see where the original driver seated 
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Thereafter, the defendant was requested to step from the 
vehicle and perform certain field sobriety tests and after 
performing those tests, Officer Simonson arrested the defendant 
for driving under the influence. (TR 41-42) 
The defendant in addition to a breath test which was 
performed, was requested to take a blood or urine test, which the 
defendant politely declined to do and at no time ever agreed to 
give a urine sample. (TR 48) 
Officer L.E. Earl of the Logan City Police Department also 
testified that during the booking he observed Cache County Sheriff 
Deputy Maples remove a small bindle or something containing a 
powdery substance from defendant's pocket during the booking 
procedure. (TR 56) 
Cache County Deputy, Dale Maples also testified the 
defendant was in a holding cell and after the defendant used a 
toilet or urinal, Officer Simonson requested he be removed to 
another holding cell so a urine sample could be obtained. (TR 60) 
Officer Maples officer testified that from where he was 
sitting, he could not see the defendant urinating but could see 
him standing at the urinal. (TR 62) 
From the above and foregoing testimony elicited at the 
preliminary hearing, the defendant offers the Memorandum of Points 
and Authorities in support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the 
four (4) count Information against the above defendant: 
MEMORANDUM 
THE ACTIONS OF THE POLICE OFFICER STOPPING THE 
VEHICLE WAS IN VIOLATION OF U.C.A. 77-7-15. 
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"A peace officer may stop any person in a 
public place when he has a reasonable suspicion that 
he has committed or is in the act of committing or 
is attempting to commit a public offense, and may 
demand his name, address and an explanation of his 
actions•" 
In State v. Talbot, 792 P2d 489 (Utah, App. 1990), the Utah 
Court of Appeals in one of a series of cases dealing with a brief 
investigatory stop pursuant to U.C.A. 77-7-15 provided that the 
reasonable suspicion contained in such statute must be based upon 
objective facts, which indicate the existence of criminal activity 
and the peace officer must be able to articulate what it is about 
those facts which leads to an inference of criminal activity. 
State v. Talbot, cited supra, further provides the facts 
must be judged against an objective standard, or in other words, 
would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the 
seizure, warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief the 
action taken was appropriate and anything less would invite 
intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights based on 
nothing more substantial than inarticulate hunches. 
In State v. Talbot, cited supra, the basic facts 
established that as the defendant's vehicle crested a hill 
approximately one quarter of a mile from a 1:00 a.m. roadblock and 
stopped abruptly turning around in the middle of the road and 
headed away from the roadblock did not provide a reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity to justify a stop of the vehicle. 
The Court of Appeals concluded such case was about avoiding 
7 
contact with the police officer and avoiding a road block does not 
create an articulable suspicion that the occupants of the vehicle 
have engaged in or about to engage in criminal activity. Thus, the 
stop of the vehicle was an unwarranted police intrusion and all 
evidence obtained was suppressed. The court refused to allow 
bootstrapping traffic violations as a basis for the stop, when the 
real thrust for the stop was avoidance of the road block. 
In State v. Baird, 763 P2d 1214 (Utah, App. 1988), the 
Court held reasonable suspicion depends on the totality of the 
circumstances and made reference to a number of prior Utah 
decisions relating to what constitutes reasonable suspicion. The 
court held no reasonable articulable suspicion exists to justify 
the stop where the officer articulated as follows: 
"Something just struck me funny about it, referring 
to the license plate sticker." 
Such reference to the license plate sticker and Officer 
Simonson's testimony at the preliminary hearing in this proceeding 
smacks of similarity in that Officer Simonson testified: 
"As it pulled from the curb, I turned to make a 
comment to my ride along that something was unusual 
due to the fact that you don't normally change 
drivers, but with the nearness of it being from a 
drinking establishment, that may be one of the 
reasons that one of the reasons that they changed 
drivers." 
In State v. Carpena, 714 P2d 674 (Utah, 1986) , the Utah 
Supreme Court declared the police officer lacked reasonable 
suspicion to stop an automobile with out of state license plates 
moving slowly at 3:00 a.m through a neighborhood where a rash of 
burglaries had recently occurred. 
8 
In Sandy City v. Thorsness, 778 P2d 1011 (Utah, App. 1989) 
the Court of Appeals was confronted with a situation where a 
police officer was stopped assisting a motorist in the outside 
lane of a four-lane street at 1:30 a.m. and the defendant, when 
driving by the scene in the same direction pulled around the 
officerfs vehicle and stopped his car to observe the activity of 
the officer and occupant until waived on by the officer. Then the 
defendant hesitated momentarily before moving away and pulled away 
at a slow rate of speed when no other traffic was in the area at 
such hour. The peace officer making the stop, shortly thereafter, 
followed the defendant's vehicle for several blocks and did not 
observe any suspicious or exceptional driving behavior or traffic 
violations, but noted the defendant drove slowly in the inside 
lane, twenty miles per hour in a forty five mile per hour zone, 
but did not commit any traffic violation or impede traffic during 
such time. 
With such information, the Court of Appeals declared 
stopping the defendant's vehicle could be justified only upon a 
showing of reasonable suspicion the defendant had committed or was 
committing a crime or he was stopped incident to a traffic 
offense, and that the suspicion must be based upon articulated 
objective facts. 
The Court of Appeals in Sandy City v. Thorsness, cited 
supra, held as follows: 
"Defendant did not engage in reckless, erratic 
driving patterns that indicated a lack of vehicle 
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The court declared while there may be a multitude of factors that 
objectively indicate the intoxication of a driver, we do not 
believe the driving behavior in this case reasonably supports the 
suspicion of drunk driving. Further, the officer's testimony the 
defendant's slower driving speed and his failure to "'move on 
immediately1, when requested on a deserted street at 1:30 a.m. 
while possible indicia of intoxication, are equally indicia of 
innocent behavior and without more, do not provide a reasonable 
basis to suspect defendant of being intoxicated.11 
Similarly, in State v. Robinson, 797 P2d 431 (Utah, App. 
1990), the Utah Court of Appeals held avoidance of eye contact is 
consistent with innocent as well as criminal behavior, and as 
such, can be afforded no weight in determining a detaining 
officer's reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. 
Additionally, in State v. Robinson, cited supra, the Court of 
Appeals declared the weight to be given the absence of any 
visible cold weather gear or clothing (in winter) is also slight 
since it does not objectively suggest that criminal activity is 
afoot and is consistent with innocent as well as criminal 
behavior. 
The import of Thorsness and Robinson, is behavioral action 
must reasonably suggest criminal activity is afoot as opposed to 
mere innocent behavior for any behavior, depending upon the 
observer's subjective beliefs may infer whatever the observer 
wants such behavior to suggest. 
Officer Simonson in the instant case after his observations 
10 
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being from a drinking establishment, that may be one of the 
reasons that they changed drivers" and such statement by the 
officer himself, illustrates such behavior is as indicative of 
innocent conduct as well as criminal activity. This also must be 
coupled with the fact officer Simonson testified he saw no use of 
alcohol in the vehicle, nor did he make any observations of the 
occupants having been at a drinking establishment. 
Consequently, defendant asserts the stopping of the 
automobile, required a reasonable articulable suspicion that 
defendant had committed a public offense and such reasonable 
suspicion is not present in the instant proceeding and all 
evidence obtained should be suppressed. 
Point II 
WHILE A POLICE OFFICER MAY STOP AN AUTOMOBILE 
FOR A TRAFFIC VIOLATION COMMITTED IN THE OFFICER'S 
PRESENCE, IT IS IMPERMISSIBLE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT 
OFFICERS TO USE A MISDEMEANOR AS A PRETEXT TO 
SEARCH FOR EVIDENCE OF A MORE SERIOUS CRIME 
In State v. Sierra, 754 P2d 972 (Utah, App. 1988), the 
Court of Appeals held as follows: 
"In determining whether a stop for a traffic 
violation and subsequent arrest is a pretext, the 
totality of the circumstances governed- Bignoni-
Ponce, 422 US App. 855 N.10 95S Ct. App. 2582n 10. 
Making this determination, the subjective intent of 
the officer is irrelevant. Whether a Fourth 
Amendment violation has occurred turns on an 
objective assessment of the officer's actions in 
light of the facts and circumstances confronting him 
at the time and not on the officer's actual state of 
mind at the time the challenged action was taken." 
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the officer's stop of Sierra for driving in the left lane, was an 
unconstitutional pretext, that it is necessary to focus on a 
hypothetical reasonable officer in view of the totality of the 
circumstances confronting him at the time and would such 
hypothetical reasonable officer have stopped Sierra to issue a 
warning for driving in the left lane. Thus, the proper inquiry 
does not focus on whether the officer could validly have made the 
stop of Sierra but whether would such hypothetical reasonable 
officer have made the stop in the absence of pretextual 
motivation. 
The Court of Appeals declared in State v. Sierra, cited 
supra, a traffic violator is not immune from the seizure evidence 
of a more serious crime provided the gravity of the traffic 
offense is such that any citizen would routinely be stopped for it 
if seen committing the offense by a traffic officer on routine 
patrol. 
In the instant proceeding, Officer Simonson observed the u-
turn being made without lights, lasting approximately ten seconds 
at which time the lights of the vehicle were turned on, observed 
the driver stop at the stop sign, proceed through the 
intersection, pull over to the curb a safe distance from the 
intersection, and exit the vehicle without any indication of 
intoxication. This leads to the conclusion that Officer Simonson 
stopped the vehicle because of the exchanging of drivers rather 
than the short period of time when the lights were not 
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In State v. Talbot, cited supra, the Court of Appeals in 
the roadblock case declared and ruled as follows: 
"It is obvious to us from the evidence produced 
at the suppression hearing, that the stop was not 
based at the time, upon any traffic violations, but 
rather on the conclusion, however flawed, that 
avoidance of the roadblock gave rise to a reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity. It is 
inconsequential that the officers could have stopped 
the vehicle for one or more traffic violations, 
where in fact the stop was for other reasons. 
Courts do not allow an officer to stop and 
investigate a 'hunch' about criminal activity 
through the guise of a pretextual traffic 
violation. Sierra 752 at 977. For the same reason, 
we will not allow the state to justify this stop on 
the retroactive basis that the officers might have 
stopped defendants vehicle for traffic violations 
appellate counsel believes it occurred prior to the 
stop." 
Similarly, the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Arroyo, 796 
P2d 684 (Utah, 1990) adopted the conclusions of the Court of 
Appeals relative to the pretextual stop (State v. Arroyo 770 P2d 
153 (Utah App. 1989) holding that under the totality of the 
circumstances, a reasonable officer would not have stopped the 
defendant and cited him for following too closely except for the 
unarticulated suspicion of more serious criminal activity. 
Defendant asserts that failure to use headlights for 
approximately ten (10) seconds is pretextual for the stop is 
additionally illustrated by the officer's testimony. Officer 
Simonson testified he made no attempt to leave his parked 
position until after the exchange of drivers and his thought that 
something was unusual due to the fact that ,f you do not normally 
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establishment that may be one of the reasons that they changed 
drivers." 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant asserts that stopping of the vehicle in which 
defendant was an occupant was not pursuant to a traffic violation 
of no lights, but rather constitutes a pretext to stop the vehicle 
for a more serious violation and is therefore constitutionally 
impermissible. 
The investigatory stop of the vehicle, based upon the 
changing of drivers is little more than a "hunch" and the fact 
that his "hunch" has some validity while perhaps a tribute to 
Officer Simonson's intuition is not sufficient to justify, ex post 
facto, a stop that was not objectively reasonable at its 
inception as declared in State v. Sierra, in almost the same terms 
as stated herein. 
Defendant asserts a reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity afoot was necessary to justify the investigatory stop 
and the objective facts do not indicate the existence of criminal 
activity in this case. Without such requisite to the stop all 
evidence should be suppressed by virtue of the improper intrusion 
in stopping the vehicle, 
WHEREFORE, the defendant prays the court suppress all 
evidence obtained as a result of the unlawful stop of the vehicle. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / y 7 day of March, 1992. 
/ ) ^ " 
RONALD W. PERKINS R' 
Attorney for Defendant 
14 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Motion to the plaintiff's attorney, James Jenkins 
of the Cache County Attorney's Office, 110 North 100 West, Logan, 
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RONALD W. PERKINS (2568) of 
FARR, KAUFMAN, SULLIVAN, GORMAN, 
JENSEN, MEDKSER & PERKINS 
Attorney for Defendant 
Bamberger Square Building 
205 - 26th Street, Suite 34 
Ogden, Utah 844 01 
Telephone: (801) 394-5526 
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARK G. MILLER, 
Defendant. 
/ 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 




Case No. 911000694FS 
JUDGE: Gordon J. Low 
COMES NOW the defendant, MARK MILLER, by and through his 
attorney, Ronald w. Perkins, and hereby motions the above entitled 
court to dismiss and/or suppress the specimen result. 
Such Motion is made upon the basis and for the reason that 
the testimony adduced at the preliminary hearing establishes such 
evidence should be dismissed and/or suppressed for the reasons set 
forth hereinafter. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On February 1, 1991, Officer Dennis Simonson, a Police 
Officer for Logan City was on duty at approximately 11:30 p.m. and 
proceeded to the intersection of Church and Federal Avenues in 
Logan, Utah. (TR 6-7) 
Officer Simonson testified at the preliminary hearing as he 
got to the intersection of Church and Federal he made a turn 
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Cherokee parked at the east curb facing northbound. He proceeded 
past that vehicle and pulled into a parking lot approximately 60-
80 feet away with his purpose to see if anyone in the vehicle was 
going to be drinking out of an open container since he was working 
a special alcohol assignment that night. (TR 7) 
After being stationary for approximately one (1) minute 
waiting to see if there would be any alcohol violation in the 
vehicle, the vehicle's motor started up and a few seconds later 
it pulled northbound a length or two and negotiated a u-turn and 
did so without headlights or taillights on the vehicle. As the 
vehicle made the u-turn, it proceeded south on Church Street and 
as it got to the stop sign at Federal Avenue, it made a complete 
stop and the lights came on in the vehicle. (TR 8-9) 
Officer Simonson further testified that the vehicle was in 
the travel lane not in the parking lane at that time, and after a 
second or two, the vehicle progressed across the intersection 
approximately seventy-five (75) feet and pulled to the curb and 
parked. He then observed the driver get out of the driver's side 
and walk around the vehicle when another person exited the 
passenger side and replaced the first person as the driver. (TR 
9) 
Officer Simonson then left the parking lot and proceeded to 
follow the vehicle as it was proceeding up towards First East, 
with said vehicle being the only vehicle on the road at that 
particular time and eventually followed the vehicle to an area 
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activated and the vehicle was pulled over and stopped. (TR 9) 
As Officer Simonson approached the driver of the vehicle, 
Mr- Franklin, he told him that he wanted to speak to his 
passenger, and thereupon walked around the vehicle to the 
passenger area of the Jeep, where he observed the defendant 
seated. (TR 11) 
There was a second Mr. Miller (Chris Miller) in the rear of 
the vehicle but Officer Simonson addressed his attention to the 
defendant herein and stated as follows: 
"I told him the reason I was talking to him was 
I observed his vehicle pull over to the side and I 
asked him why he got out of the vehicle and changed 
drivers. His statement to me at that time, if I may 
quote, was, 'I have had too much to drink so I 
didn't want to drive1". (TR 11-12) 
Officer Simonson additionally testified prior to that 
statement having been made by the defendant, he could not identify 
the defendant as the driver of the vehicle. 
Upon cross examination, Officer Simonson testified there is 
a street light in that particular area on that intersection, but 
that he did not know which corner it faced on. (TR 28) Further, 
he could not identify the driver seated in the vehicle because of 
the position the driver was in, in the shaded area inside the 
vehicle. (TR 28) 
Officer Simonson testified to the time period involving in 
the making of the u-turn as follows: 
"If you take the time from the motor starting 
and then leaving the curb, you would have more than 
ten (10) seconds. As far as the actual driving, it 
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Officer Simonson indicated that the lights were turned on 
at the intersection and the vehicle proceeded a safe distance of 
approximately seventy-five (75) feet the other side of the 
intersection before seeing the driver get out and walk to the 
other side, (TR 31) 
After seeing the exchange of drivers, offered the following 
in response to questions by counsel as to why he proceeded to 
follow the vehicle: 
Q: Okay, now as it proceeded up there are you 
still parked at your vantage point where you had 
made your other observations? 
A: As it pulled from the curb, I turned to 
make a comment to my ride-along that something was 
unusual, due to the fact that you donft normally 
change drivers, but with the nearness of it being 
from a drinking establishment, that may be one of 
the reasons that they changed drivers. At that 
time, I left the parking lot and proceeded after the 
vehicle. 
Q: So I guess what your telling me is it went 
through your mind that we're near a drinking 
establishment so maybe alcohol is involved? 
A: That's correct. 
Q: You had no observations _to indicate that 
factor to you, though, did you?-""" 
A: That's correct. 1/tlH 
The following testimony w^s also addtfced from Officer 
Simonson: 
Q: As he proceeded through the intersection, 
right? 
A: The lights were on as he proceeded. He 
stopped. There was a stop of at least a full 
second, then the lights were on and the then vehicle 


















~ 03 <* 
oo ai Z 
-c W y 
*§ O Q 
s * a 
^ K ° 
< 
Q: So the vehicle made a proper stop? 
A: Yes, it did. 
Q: And there was nothing unusual about the 
way it proceeded through the intersection or pulled 
to the curb on the other side of the highway, other 
side of the intersection, is that correct? 
A: That's correct. 
Q: Now, as the vehicle made that particular 
u-turn, where you first observed it into motion, 
without the lights, as you testified to, was there 
anything unusual, other than the lights not being 
on, or indicative of person being under the 
influence of any kind of drugs or alcohol? 
A: NO. (_ J£ {/<)) 
Officer Simonson testified that after the exchange of 
drivers there was nothing to suggest that the second driver was 
under the influence of alcohol nor did such (second) individual 
commit any moving violation of any nature. (TR 36) 
The Officer further testified he had not seen where the 
original driver had seated himself after exiting the vehicle. (TR 
37) 
Officer Simonson testified that he had not seen them 
(individuals in vehicle) at the local drinking establishment in 
the area of Church and Federal and therefore did not ask the 
defendant if he had been at any such establishment. (TR 40-41) 
He also indicated he did not see where the original driver seated 
himself after exiting the vehicle. (TR 37) 
Thereafter, the defendant was requested to step from the 
vehicle and perform certain field sobriety tests and after 
performing those tests, Officer Simonson arrested the defendant 
5 
for driving under the influence. (TR 41-42) 
The defendant in addition to a breath test which was 
performed, was requested to take a blood or urine test, which the 
defendant politely declined to do and at no time ever agreed to 
give a urine sample, (TR 48) 
Officer L.E. Earl of the Logan City Police Department also 
testified that during the booking he observed Cache County Sheriff 
Deputy Maples remove a small bindle or something containing a 
powdery substance from defendant's pocket during the booking 
procedure. (TR 56) 
Cache County Deputy, Dale Maples also testified the 
defendant was in a holding cell and after the defendant used a 
toilet or urinal, Officer Simonson requested he be removed to 
another holding cell so a urine sample could be obtained. (TR 60) 
Officer Maples officer testified that from where he was 
sitting, he could not see the defendant urinating but could see 
him standing at the urinal. (TR 62) 
From the above and foregoing testimony elicited at the 
preliminary hearing, the defendant offers the following Memorandum 
of Points and Authorities in support of Defendant's Motion to 
Suppress the results of the urinalysis and its application to the 
four (4) count Information against the above defendant: 
MEMORANDUM 
This Memorandum will not discuss or relate to whether or 
not a proper chain of evidence has been established to attribute 
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address the issue of whether or not such sample was lawfully 
obtained and whether or not it is in violation of the defendant's 
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. 
It is black letter law that all warrantless searches are 
presumed unreasonable and the State must show that its conduct was 
justified under the circumstances and not violative of the United 
States Constitution and Utah Constitution. 
In the instant proceeding the question is whether or not 
Defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy while being 
held in the holding cell at the Cache County Jail after having 
been arrested for driving under the influence and possession of a 
controlled substance. 
The testimony of the officers was that all contact between 
Officer Simonson and the Defendant had terminated after the 
defendant had refused to submit to a blood or urine test. 
Consequently, the urine obtained is not admissible pursuant to the 
consent except for a warrant. 
In State v. Wilson, 582 P2d 826 (New Mexico, 1978) the New 
Mexico Court of Appeals excluded a blood sample taken by a 
technician following defendant's refusal to consent to the taking 
of such sample. Similarly, U.C.A. 41-6-44.10 the Utah Implied 
Consent Law affords all persons the right to refuse any and all 
chemical tests, subject to administrative proceedings and possible 
revocation of license. 
The Oregon Appellate Court in State v. Owczarzak, 766 P2d 
399 (Ore. App., 1988) was confronted with a situation where there 
was warrantless police surveillance of a public restroom along the 
highway and the defendant was charged with public indecency. The 
Oregon Court of Appeals in regard to warrantless searches held 
in this situation where the stalls had no doors, and the stall's 
interiors could not be seen by a person entering the restroom, 
that the defendant had a protected privacy interest in conduct 
which occurred in the area, although open to the view of others in 
the restroom. Further, declaring the issue is not whether the 
defendant's activity could have legitimately been seen by another 
in the restroom, but rather whether surreptitious surveillance was 
a search that invaded defendant's privacy and that determination 
depends upon whether the practice, if engaged in whoiely at the 
discretion of the government will significantly impair people's 
freedom from scrutiny. 
In State v. Bigqar, 716 P2d 493 (Hawaii, 1986) , the Hawaii 
Supreme Court declared that evidence gathered in a search of a 
toilet stall subsequent to the officer's illegal surveillance 
should have been suppressed. It is well settled Lhat an area in 
which an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy is 
protected by the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution as well as 
the State Constitution and cannot be searched without a warrant, 
and that any warrantless search of a constitutionally protected 
area, is presumptively unreasonable unless there is both probable 
cause and a legally recognized exception to the warrant 
requirement. 
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a warrant could not be obtained since the defendant had been 
removed from the holding area where the toilet-urinal was located 
and such area could have remained unused by other individuals 
while such a search warrant was requested from an impartial and 
detached magistrate. 
In State v. Harris, 671 P2d 175 (Utah, 1983), the Utah 
Supreme Court in reaching its ruling suppression a warrantless 
search discussed Katz v. United States, 389 US 347 (1967), 
declaring a defendant must have a subjective expectation of 
privacy, that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable and 
when such expectation is present, the defendant is guaranteed to 
be free from unreasonable searches and seizure. 
Further, when a search is conducted outside the judicial 
process without approval by a Judge or Magistrate such search is 
per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, subject to only a 
few specifically established and well delineated exceptions 
including consent, exigent circumstances, and "plain view". 
(State v. Harris, cited supra). 
The Idaho Court of Appeals in State v. Limberhand, 788 P2d 
857 (Ida. App., 1990) held, the defendant maintained a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in a toilet stall in a public restroom and 
the plain view doctrine had no application because it did not 
validate seizure of evidence in plain view when such observation 
had its genesis in a fourth amendment violation. 
The fact the defendant herein is under arrest and is being 
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defendant in a situation where he was under the complete dominion 
and control of the officers or jailers. 
Defendant asserts there is still an expectation of privacy 
in using a toilet-urinal while confined in a jail and that to 
permit admission of evidence seized in this fashion could lead to 
more egregious fourth amendment violation such as securing 
evidence of alcohol or drugs with any intoxicated driver merely by 
holding them until such time as urinating becomes a necessity. 
To allow the admission of this evidence, would as 
indicated above allow a seizure which is per se unreasonable, 
being a warrantless search, in violation of defendant's state and 
federal constitutional rights. 
WHEREFORE, the defendant prays that the urine sample be 
suppressed as violation of defendants rights. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this \") day of March, 1992. 
**' < ' < ' c 
/ 
RONALD W. PERKINS 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Motion to the plaintiff's attorney, James Jenkins 
of the Cache County Attorney's Office, 110 North 100 West, Logan, 
Utah 84321 on this I ~) day of March, 1992. "} 





•RONALD W. PERKINS (2568) of 
FARR, KAUFMAN, SULLIVAN, GORMAN, 
JENSEN, MEDKSER & PERKINS 
Attorney for Defendant 
Bamberger Square Building 
205 - 26th Street, Suite 34 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 394-5526 
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 







/ Case No. 911000694FS 
JUDGE: Gordon J. Low 
/ 
COMES NOW the defendant, by and through his attorney, 
RONALD W. PERKING, and in response to the Memorandum submitted by 
the plaintiff, submits the following reply memorandum: 
REPLY MEMORANDUM 
DEFENDANT ASSERTS THAT THE POLICE 
OFFICERS' STOP WAS A PRETEXT STOP 
The Utah Court of Appeals in State v. Lopez, 181 Utah Adv. 
Rep 41, (March 2, 1992) discussed in length pretext stops and the 
objective officer's standard. 
In State v. Lopez, cited supra, the Court of Appeals in 
follow up to the cases defendant has supplied in his original 
Memorandum, declared as follows: 
1 
Thus, the issue of whether a traffic stop is a 
pretext stop cannot turn on the issue of an officer 
subjective intent, but rather must turn on the 
objective question of whether a reasonable officer's 
would have made the stop under the same 
circumstances absent the illegal motivation. 
Sierra, 754 P2d at 977-78; United States v. Smith, 
799 F2d at 710-11; Kehoe, 521 S02d at 1097. 
"A stop is unreasonable, not because 
the officer secretly hopes to find 
evidence of a greater offense, but because 
it is clear that an officer would have 
been uninterested in pursuing the lesser 
offense absent that hope. In other words, 
the proper basis of concern is not with 
why the officer deviated from the usual 
practice in this case but simply that he 
did deviate." 
In United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704 (11th Circuit, 
1986) , a case which the Utah Court of Appeals cited in State v. 
Lopez, cited supra, similarly declared in determining whether an 
investigative stop is invalid as pretextual the proper inquiry is 
whether a reasonable officer would have made the seizure in the 
absence of legitimate motivation and not whether the officer could 
validly have made the stop, but whether under the circumstances, a 
reasonable officer would have made the stop in the absence of the 
invalid purpose. 
Defendant asserts that many cases have held, including 
United States v. Smith, cited supra, that while a "hunch" may 
prove correct, it is attribute to a policeman's intuition, but is 
not sufficient to justify, expose facto, a seizure, that was not 
objectively reasonable at its inception. 
In the instant proceeding, the investigating officer 
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driving pattern of the defendant was proper other than the pulling 
from the curb and not turning on the lights immediately. 
This coupled with the investigating officerfs subjective 
belief the nearness to a drinking establishment may be one of the 
reasons the driver changed positions precipitated the officer 
leaving his parked position. 
From the officerfs testimony, he left the parking lot area 
af~er the exchange of drivers not after he had observed the short 
period of time without lights as the vehicle pulled from the curb. 
The defendant asserts this to be a classic example of a 
,fh^nchlf, and such "hunch" does not justify the stop of the vehicle 
in which the defendant was an occupant at the time of the stop. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J?C) day of Jte^h, 1992. 
)NALD W. PERKINS 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Memorandum to the plaintiff's attorney, James 
Jenkins of the Cache County Attorney's Office, 110 North 100 West, 
Logan, Utah 84321 on this Q J ^ d a Y o f March, 1992.^ ^ j 
3 
f -p f f 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF CACHE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
Plaintiff ] 
vs. ] 
MARK G. MILLER, ] 
Defendant ] 
> MEMORANDUM DECISION 
) CASE NO. 911000087 
THIS MATTER IS before the Court upon the Defendant's Motion 
to Quash the Bindover. Cited for authority by the Defendant is 
State vs, Humphrey, 176 Advanced Reports (Dec. 18, 1991). This 
Court has earlier ruled on the issue with respect to whether 
State vs. Humphrey requires a full review of the transcript of 
the Preliminary Hearing. Nevertheless, the Court has reviewed 
the entire transcript. With respect to the issues raised in 
State vs. Humphrey, specifically that of jurisdiction, the 
Court finds that it does have jurisdiction in this case. 
Specifically with respect to the corpus delicti argument raised 
by the defense and for the reasons set forth in the State's 
Response, the Motion is denied. Evidence was produced that the 
Defendant was stopped as a result of illegal conduct (operating 
a vehicle after dark, u-turn, no lights) and when further 
inquiry was made, by the officer, as to behavior by the 
Defendant, he volunteered that he had too much to drink to be 
able to drive. That simply lead to further investigation by 
the officer. 
Whether that statement is specifically necessary in order 
to establish corpus delicti depends upon the availability or 
lack of other facts. The officer did have facts available to 
him, by observation, that someone was operating the vehicle and 
that 
State vs. Miller 
#911000087 
Page 2 
someone left the vehicle and went around to the passenger 
side. Whether that specific person was the Defendant or the 
person in the back seat that had been operating the vehicle was 
cleared up by an admission by the Defendant that he in fact had 
been drinking to much and therefore did not want to drive. 
Thereafter field sobriety and breath tests were administered. 
Defendant can still raise the defense that in fact it was not 
he who was driving, but was the passenger found in the rear of 
the vehicle. Circumstantial evidence would be sufficient 
without the admission by the Defendant, and for preliminary 
hearing purposes that he was the driver in order for the State 
to establish the corpus delicti of the crime. For purposes of 
affirming the finding of the magistrate and the bindover order. 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
The Defendant has moved this Court to suppress the specimen 
result taken as an invasion of the Defendant's privacy. For 
reasons set forth in the State's Response thereto that Motion 
is denied. 
MOTION TO DISMISS OR SUPPRESS 
This matter is likewise before the Court upon a Motion to 
Dismiss or Suppress for the reason that the Defendant was 
stopped without probable cause and in violation of Section 
77-7-15 of the Utah Code and in addition thereto that the stop 
was a pretext stop. 
The Court has already addressed the issue with respect to 
the violation of the traffic laws observed by the officer and 
State vs. Miller 
#911000087 
Page 3 
its causal sufficiently to stop the vehicle in which the 
Defendant was riding to either issue a citation or further 
investigate. Upon further investigation it was determined that 
intoxication was a factor. In addition, the officer had some 
suspicion that there may be something more wrong with the 
Defendant's driving than simply making an improper u-turn with 
out lights. 
The question is whether the officer is permitted by law, 
given the totality of the circumstances to make the stop. This 
Court would find that in fact the officer articulated a 
reasonable cause to stop the vehicle and pursuant thereto 
inquired of the driver as to the behavior. His response could 
have been a number of things, such as he simply forgot to turn 
the lights on or otherwise, but his response was, "I have had 
to much to drink". The initial stop was justified. In the 
Defendant giving the statement and all of the other 
circumstances involved, the Court finds that the stop was 
justified as was the further investigation and therefore the 
Motion is denied. 
Counsel for the State is directed to prepare a formal Order 
in conformance herewith. 
Dated this 27th day of April, 1992. -x 
BY THE COURT ""' * ^ ^ 1 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT I MAILED A TRUE AND CORRECT COPY OF THE 
ATTACHED NOTICE, BY FIRST CLASS MAIL, POSTAGE PREPAID, 
TO THE FOLLOWING: 
JAMES C. JENKINS 
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF 
110 NORTH 1ST WEST 
67 EAST 100 NORTH 
LOGAN UT 84321 
RONALD W. PERKINS 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
205 - 26TH STREET 
SUITE 34 
OGDEN UT 844 01 
DATED THIS _£2i -XL DAY OF 19 52. 
5/LOIS R. DANKS 
Deputy Clerk 
"G" 
RONALD W. PERKINS (2568) of 
FARR, KAUFMAN, SULLIVAN, GORMAN, 
JENSEN, MEDSKER & PERKINS 
Attorney for Defendant 
Bamberger Square Building 
205 - 26th Street, Suite 34 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 394-5526 
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 









MOTION FOR DETERMINATION 
ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE 
Case No. 911000694FS 
JUDGE: Gordon J. Low 
COMES NOW the defendant, MARK MILLER, by and through his 
attorney, Ronald W. Perkins, and hereby motions the above entitled 
court pursuant to Utah Rules of Evidence 104(a) to determine the 
admissibility of certain evidence. 
Such Motion relates to the admissibility of the urine 
obtained by Officer Simonson from the jail urinal, whether it can 
be attributed to the defendnat and the potential prejudicial 
effect that would or could result if admitted into evidence 
without a full evidentiary hearing determining whether or not such 
evidence should be admissible. 
WHEREFORE, the defendant prays for an evidentiary hearing 
to determine the admissibility of such evidence in that such 
evidence is a preliminary question under Rule 104 of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence and should properly be determined prior to the 
time of trial. 
THEREFORE, the defendant prays that this court set a date 
and time for such evidentiary hearing and determination. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this V day of November, 1992. 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Motion to the plaintiff's attorney, James Jenkins 
of the Cache County Attorney's Office, 110 North 100 West, Logan, 
Utah 84321 on this 3 day of November, 1992. 
SBqRET^ 
/ .ilCf^d pu.Qs.uJ_ . !L I , r j ^ - e f f^ 
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RONALD W. PERKINS (2568) of 
FARR, KAUFMAN, SULLIVAN, GORMAN, 
JENSEN, MEDSKER & PERKINS 
Attorney for Defendant 
Bamberger Square Building 
205 - 26th Street, Suite 34 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 394-5526 
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, / 
DEFENDANT'S SUPPLEMENTAL 
Plaintiff, / MOTION TO DISMISS OR SUPPRESS 
vs. / 
MARK G. MILLER, / Case No. 911000694FS 
JUDGE: Gordon J. Low 
Defendant. / 
COMES NOW the defendant, MARK MILLER, by and through his 
attorney, Ronald W. Perkins, and hereby motions the above entitled 
court to dismiss and/or suppress the four (4) count information, 
charging the defendant with various criminal offenses. 
Such Motion is made upon the basis and for the reason that 
the testimony adduced at the preliminary hearing establishes such 
evidence should be dismissed and/or suppressed for the reasons set 
forth hereinafter. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On February 1, 1991, Officer Dennis Simonson, a Police 
Officer for Logan City was on duty at approximately 11:30 p.m. and 
proceeded to the intersection of Church and Federal Avenues in 
Logan, Utah. (TR 6-7) 
Officer Simonson testified at the preliminary hearing as 
















going north and at the time of doing so, observed a red Jeep 
Cherokee parked at the east curb facing northbound. He proceeded 
past that vehicle and pulled into a parking lot approximately 60 -
80 feet away with his purpose to see if anyone in the vehicle was 
going to be drinking out of an open container since he was working 
a special alcohol assignment that night. (TR 7) 
After being stationary for approximately one (1) minute 
waiting to see if there would be any alcohol violation in the 
vehicle, the vehicle's motor started up and a few seconds later it 
pulled northbound a length or two and negotiated a u-turn and did 
so without headlights or taillights on the vehicle. As the 
vehicle made the u-turn, it proceeded south on Church Street and 
as it got to the stop sign at Federal Avenue, it made a complete 
stop and the lights came on in the vehicle. (TR 8-9) 
Officer Simonson further testified that the vehicle was in 
the travel lane not in the parking lane at that time, and after a 
second or two, the vehicle progressed across the intersection 
approximately seventy-five (75} feet and pulled to the curb and 
parked. He then observed the driver get out of the driver's side 
and walk around the vehicle when another person exited the 
passenger side and replaced the first person as the driver. (TR 
9) 
Officer Simonson then left the parking lot and proceeded 
to follow the vehicle as it was proceeding up towards First East, 
with said vehicle being the only vehicle on the road at that 
particular time and eventually followed the vehicle to an area 



























activated and the vehicle was pulled over and stopped* (TR 9) 
As Officer Simonson approached the driver of the vehicle, 
Mr. Franklin, he told him that he wanted to speak to his 
passenger, and thereupon walked around the vehicle to the 
passenger area of the Jeep, where he observed the defendant 
seated. (TR 11) 
Initially, Officer Simonson testified that after the 
exchange of drivers there was nothing to suggest that the second 
driver was under the influence of alcohol, nor did said second 
individual commit any moving violation of any nature. (TR 36) 
ARGUMENTS 
77-7-15, AUTHORITY OF A PEACE OFFICER TO 
STOP AND QUESTION SUSPECT - GROUNDS 
"A peace officer may stop any person in a 
public place when he has a reasonable suspicion to 
believe he has committed or is in the act of 
committing, or is attempting to commit a public 
offense, and may demand his name, address and an 
explanation of his actions." 
To stop a moving vehicle being driven by an individual who 
has committed no moving violation, nor who is not suspected of 
having committed any public offense for the purpose of speaking 
with a passenger, as to why he got out of the vehicle and changed 
drivers constitutes an impermissible seizure. 
In the instant proceeding, Officer Simonson, after 
effectuating the stop of the vehicle driven by Mr. Franklin who 
had traversed from 75 feet approximately south of the intersection 
at Federal Way and Church Street, who had then travelled to First 
North then proceeding to First East and ultimately to Center 
Street and approximately 250 East, in front of the Roller Rink 
-3-
where he is finally stopped. 
Officer Simonson testified that he followed the vehicle 
with Mr. Franklin driving for two (2) blocks even after he had 
caught up with the vehicle. (TR 35) 
Defendant contends that such actions by the Officer 
effectuating the stop and the intrusion at that point violates the 
defendant passenger's expectation of privacy. 
It is noteworthy that UCA 77-7-15 provides for a peace 
officer stopping a person in a public place and effectuating this 
stop supersedes the authority of the statute since there is a 
reasonable expectation of privacy within the vehicle and such 
vehicle compartment is not open to the public, and therefore, not 
a public place. 
Thus the intrusion to talk to the passenger is violative 
of the defendants Fourth Amendments rights to be free from 
unreasonable search and seizure since a seizure occurred when the 
vehicle was stopped and he was not free to go. 
Wherefore, the defendant prays that this court dismiss 
and/or suppress all evidence obtained after his unlawful seizure 
which occurred when the vehicle was stopped. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this , <sp day of ,November, 1992. 
RONALD W. PERKINS 
Attorney for Defendant 
-4-
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Motion to the plaintiff's attorney, James Jenkins 
of the Cache County Attorney's Office, 110 North 100 West, Logan, 





IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH 







Case No. 911000087 
Through plea negotiations between counsel, the above-named 
Defendant pled guilty to the the following offenses: 
Count 1. UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE 
- a 3rd Degree Felony. 
Count 2. UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA - a 
Class B Misdemeanor. 
Count 3. DUI - a Class B Misdemeanor. 
Count 4. FAILURE TO USE HEADLIGHTS 
Misdemeanor. 
a Class B 
The Defendant, being present and being represented by 
counsel, and there being no legal reason why sentence in this 
matter should not be imposed, is hereby sentenced as follows: 
Basic Sentence. 
Count 1: 
1. The Defendant shall be imprisoned in the Utah State 
Prison for a term of not to exceed five (5) years, with 
a minimum term of two and one-half (2 1/2) years. 
Count 2: 
1. The Defendant shall be incarcerated in the Cache County 
Jail for a term not to exceed six (6) months. 
Count 3: 
1. The Defendant shall be incarcerated in the Cache County 
Jail for a term not to exceed six (6) months. 
Count 4: 
1. The Defendant shall be incarcerated in the Cache County 
Jail for a term not to exceed six (6) months. 
The sentences shall be served concurrently. 
DATED this day of February, 1993. 
BY THE COURT: 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Judgment, Sentence and Commitment to Ron Perkins, 
Attorney for Defendant, at Bamberger Square Building, 205 26th 
Street, Suite 34, Ogden, UT 84401. 
DATED this /&* day of February, 1993. 
2 
•J" 
RONALD W. PERKINS, #2568 of 
FARR, KAUFMAN, SULLIVAN, GORMAN, 
JENSEN, MEDSKER & PERKINS 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Bamberger Square Building 
205 26th Street, Suite 34 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 394-5526 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 










NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Criminal No. 911000694 
Judge: Gordon J. Low 
TO THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT: 
YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the defendant-appellant 
above named, does hereby appeal that certain conviction 
pursuant to Stipulation reserving defendant's appellate rights, 
on the 18th day of December, 1992, consisting of convictions of 
Possession of a Controlled Substance, a third degree felony, 
Driving under Influence of Alcohol, a class "B" misdemeanor, 
Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a class "B" misdemeanor, and 
no Headlights, Class B misdemeanor and sentenced by the 
Honorable Gordon J. Low on the 9th day of February, 1993. 
DATED this 9th day of February 1993. 
r^^.oJL 
JALD W. PERKINS, 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Notice of Appeal to the plaintiff's attorney, 
JAMES C. JENKINS, at 110 North 100 West, Logan, Utah 84 321 on 




RONALD W. PERKINS (2568) of 
FARR, KAUFMAN, SULLIVAN, GORMAN, 
JENSEN, MEDSKER & PERKINS 
Attorney for Defendant 
Bamberger Square Building 
205 - 26th Street, Suite 34 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 394-552 6 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, / 
STIPULATION FOR CERTIFICATE 
Plaintiff, / OF PROBABLE CAUSE 
vs. / 
MARK G. MILLER, / Case No. 911000694FS 
JUDGE: Gordon J. Low 
Defendant. / 
COMES NOW the plaintiff by and through its attorney, JAMES 
C. JENKINS, and the defendant, by and through his attorney, RONALD 
W. PERKINS, and pursuant to the Statement by Defendant in Advance 
of Plea of Guilty heretofore entered on the 18th day of December, 
1992, and the agreement of the plaintiff and defendant, it is 
hereby stipulated and agreed as follows: 
1. That the defendant has plead guilty as charged to the 
charge to all offenses, with such pleas being conditional pleas 
from which said defendant can appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
2. That plaintiff and defendant have agreed that a 
Certificate of Probable Cause be issued and said defendant's 
Appeal with the State specifically declaring that while the State 
does not believe that defendant will prevail on appeal, legitimate 
and meritorious appellate issues do exist. 
THAT BASED upon the above 
defendant hereby stipulate and 
Certificate of Probable Cause 
DATED this ( day 
JAMES C. JENKINS, 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
and foregoing, the plaintiff and 
agree that the court issue a 
of February, 1993. 
RONALD W. PERKINS 
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RONALD W. PERKINS (2568) of 
FARR, KAUFMAN, SULLIVAN, GORMAN, 
JENSEN, MEDSKER & PERKINS 
Attorney for Defendant 
Bamberger Square Building 
205 - 26th Street, Suite 34 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 394-5526 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
vs. 








ORDER AND CERTIFICATE 
OF PROBABLE CAUSE 
Case No. 911000694FS 
JUDGE: Gordon J. Low 
Based upon the foregoing Stipulation between the parties, 
and good cause appearing, and the court being fully cognizant of 
all matters herein, now therefor, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that pursuant 
to Rule 27 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Honorable, 
Gordon J. Low, judge of the above entitled court, does hereby 
certify that in his opinion probable cause exists for the taking 
by the defendant of an appeal of the above matter to the Utah 
Court of Appeals. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
execution of sentence heretofore entered in the above matter shall 
be stayed in its execution. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Court 
reserves the right to impose such other conditions for release as 
it may deem appropriate. 
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GORDON J. LOW 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
